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THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN NEW
YORK, 1920-1980
William E. Nelson*
S the center of American, if not world capitalism, New York has
specialized in the management and investment of money
throughout the twentieth century. Two forms of legal institu-
tion-the corporation and the trust-are among the principal devices his-
torically used by New York's money managers in pursuit of their trade.
This article will focus on one particular body of doctrine in connection
these two institutions'-the law of fiduciary duty-specifically, on the
level of honesty and care which a manager of money, whether a trustee of
a fund or a director or officer of a corporation, owes to its owner.
No explicit changes in doctrine occurred over the course of the century
in the black-letter law of fiduciary duty. But the ways in which doctrine
was applied did change subtly in two respects. The article will analyze the
two changes.
First, the article will discuss a shift in emphasis from protecting inves-
tors in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century to empower-
ing entrepreneurs during later decades. During the earlier part of the
century, the courts declared that fiduciaries were bound to the highest of
standards of loyalty to their cestuis and were free to make only limited
sorts of investments involving no conflicts of interest. Fiduciaries who
breached the rules tended to be held strictly accountable. In the latter
part of the century, in contrast, judges gave money managers increased
freedom to use and invest funds as they saw fit, subject only to the re-
quirement that they use due care in making investment choices. This shift
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1. The rules establishing the basic structure of corporation and trust law were fully
elaborated during the course of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth-century history of
corporation law in New York is discussed in RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION (1982), and is also referenced in JOHN W. CADMAN,
THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICs, 1791-1875 (1949). Since the
basic rules of corporation and trust law underwent no significant change in the twentieth
century, those rules will not be addressed in the pages that follow.
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in emphasis toward increased investment freedom occurred, it is sug-
gested, in order to facilitate the upward mobility of people with en-
trepreneurial skills and to further growth of the economy as a whole. The
shift thereby contributed to the complex process occurring in the mid-
twentieth century, which I have discussed elsewhere,2 by which the Cath-
olic and Jewish descendants of turn-of-the-century immigrants from
Southern and Eastern Europe entered the mainstream of American life.
Second, the article will outline a shift in the uses to which attorneys and
litigants put the law of fiduciary duty. During the earlier decades of the
century, courts applied the rules regulating fiduciaries in cases involving
private investment of private moneys in private enterprises. Of course,
the law of fiduciary duty remained applicable to similar private cases
throughout the second half of the century. But, beginning with World
War II, cases involving the law of fiduciary duty arose in international
and other public law contexts as well. Gradually, over the course of the
ensuing decades, the use of fiduciary concepts in cases involving public
policy issues continued to grow, and fiduciary law became a tool courts
used to address public policy matters as well as issues of private invest-
ment management. As we shall see, however, judges refused to use fidu-
ciary law to address policy issues when doing so threatened to restrict
entrepreneurial freedom.
In portraying these two shifts mentioned above, this article is divided
into three parts. Part I outlines the main doctrines of fiduciary law as it
was applied in trust and corporate cases throughout the century, with par-
ticular stress on the high standards of honesty and care to which fiducia-
ries typically were held during the earlier decades of the century. Part II
then turns to the shifting emphasis appearing in cases from the second
half of the century, encompassing increased support for entrepreneurial
activities promoting general economic growth and upward social mobil-
ity. Finally, Part III considers the growing use of fiduciary law to address
public policy issues, along with the limits that courts placed on that
growth.
I. PROTECTING INVESTMENTS: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY OF
FIDUCIARIES, 1920-1940
The basic fiduciary standard, as stated by the Court of Appeals, has
always been that a trustee is "bound, in the management of all the mat-
ters of the trust, to act in good faith and employ such vigilance, sagacity,
diligence, and prudence as in general prudent men of discretion and intel-
ligence in like matters employ in their own affairs."' 3 The "rules of fidel-
2. See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 39-53, 66-68, 101 (1995); William E. Nel-
son, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413,
438-48 (1990).
3. Brown v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 N.E. 829, 831 (N.Y. 1922). Accord, In re Clark's
Will, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (1931); In re Knower's Estate, 200 N.Y.S. 777, 778 (Sur. Ct. 1923).
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ity expected of one acting in a fiduciary capacity," according to another
court, were "something higher than 'the morals of the market place.'"4
Similarly, the law imposed on officers and directors of corporations and
on employees and other sorts of agents a duty "analogous to [that] of a
trustee towards his cestui que trust," even though they did not "techni-
cally fall ... within any of the defined fiduciary categories."5 With "this
concept," according to the leading text of the 1930's, "corporation law
bec[a]me in substance a branch of the law of trusts," although the appli-
cation of fiduciary principles in the corporate context was "less rigorous,
since the business situation demand[ed] greater flexibility than the trust
situation."' 6 But the basic fiduciary principle was the same for the corpo-
ration as for the trust-that "powers [were] conceded to the manage-
ment . .. to act for the corporation as a whole[,] ...not ...for the
purpose of benefiting one set of participants as against another."
'7
According to this basic concept of fiduciary duty, employees and other
agents were "bound at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward
their principals," to "act in accordance with the highest and truest princi-
ples of morality," 8 and never to "deal for [their] own profit with the mon-
eys of" their principal9 or to "take or assume a position antagonistic to
[their] employer's interest or duties." 10 Likewise, "[o]fficers and direc-
4. In re Young's Estate, 293 N.Y.S. 97, 103 (App. Div. 1937). "A principle firmly
fixed in equity," the court added, "was that a trustee may not deal with himself" and that
self-dealing "is enough to indicate disloyalty to the estate." Id. at 102. Accord, e.g., In re
Fulton's Will, 2 N.Y.S.2d 917, 920 (App. Div. 1938); In re Flint's Will, 266 N.Y.S. 392 (Sur.
Ct. 1933).
5. Levy v. Pacific E. Corp., 275 N.Y.S. 291, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Accord, e.g., Pink v.
Title Guar. & Trust Co., 8 N.E.2d 321, 324 (N.Y. 1937); Wangrow v. Wangrow, 207 N.Y.S.
132, 135-36 (App. Div. 1924); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
6. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 275 (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
7. Id. at 274. Going back to a debate between Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corpo-
rate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), and E. Merrick Dodd, For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932), scholars have
disagreed about the precise extent to which corporate fiduciary doctrine does and should
mirror trust doctrine. The two leading recent articles are Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The
Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director
Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (1992); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966). This Article takes no
position in regard to this disagreement; it recognizes that the scope of fiduciary duty in
corporate and trust law were never identical in this century and argues only that both
bodies of law changed in the same direction, though not necessarily at the same rate, as the
century progressed.
8. Elco Shoe Mfrs., Inc. v. Sisk, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (N.Y. 1932). Accord, Polley v.
Daniels, 264 N.Y.S. 194, 197 (App. Div. 1933); Pease & Elliman, Inc. v. Wegeman, 229
N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (App. Div. 1928). See also Berg v. Hoffman, 9 N.E.2d 806, 807 (N.Y.
1937) (holding that even voluntary gratuitous agent has duty of care). Cf. Beardsley v.
Nieblo Mfg. Co., 246 N.Y.S. 641, 646 (App. Div. 1930) (holding that lascivious advances by
corporation's manager justified his removal from job).
9. Genesee Wesleyan Seminary v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 159 N.E. 720,
722 (N.Y. 1928); Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 245 N.Y.S. 432, 434 (App. Div. 1930).
10. Keller v. American Chain Co., 174 N.E. 74, 75 (N.Y. 1930). Accord, Credit Alli-
ance Corp. v. Sheridan Theater Co., 149 N.E. 837, 838 (N.Y. 1925); Ehrich v. Andrews, 202
N.Y.S. 65,67 (App. Div. 1923); Visigraph Typewriter Mfg. Co. v Spiro Mfg. Co., 204 N.Y.S.
813, 817-18 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
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tors of a corporation owe[d] to it their undivided and unqualified loyalty"
and could "never be permitted to profit personally at the expense of the
corporation" or to "allow their private interests to conflict with the cor-
porate interests."" In addition to liability for conflicts of interest, fiduci-
aries were also liable for negligent breach of the duty of care which
resulted in damage12-that is, for failure to use the ordinary skill and
judgment of a reasonable person. 13 As Chief Judge Cardozo eloquently
summed up the law of the 1920's in Meinhard v. Salmon,14 fiduciaries
were
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tra-
dition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to under-
mine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
particular exceptions.... Only thus has the level of conduct for fidu-
ciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.15
Although Meinhard was a partnership rather than a corporate or trust
case, it was also cited in the corporate and trust contexts. 16 Nevertheless,
its impact on corporate fiduciary law is unclear, since states like Delaware
and New Jersey had already begun a process of inducing corporations to
incorporate in their jurisdictions by providing them with favorable law. 17
Important legislative changes limiting the ability of judges to protect non-
controlling shareholders from management self-favoritism were enacted
in Delaware in 1927 and 1929,18 thereby making Meinhard's impact un-
certain at best.
Whatever its actual applicability in the day-to-day administration of
corporate law, however, Meinhard reflected a prevalent ethos in Car-
dozo's time with regard to corporate as well as trust issues-an ethos that
was evidenced not only in the case law but also in the passage in 1933 and
11. Lyon v. Holton, 4 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Accord, e.g., People v. Mar-
cus, 185 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1933); Kroger v. Jaburg, 248 N.Y.S. 387, 390 (App. Div. 1931);
Traub v. Arrow Mfg. Corp., 202 N.Y.S. 121, 124 (App. Div. 1923).
12. See McCauley v. Georgia R.R. Bank, 157 N.E. 125, 127 (N.Y. 1927). Accord, e.g.,
City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Smith, 189 N.E. 222, 223 (N.Y. 1934); Barile v. Wright, 175
N.E. 351, 352 (N.Y. 1931); Wagstaff v. Holly Sugar Corp., 3 N.Y.S.2d 553, 559 (App. Div.
1938).
13. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 62
(1991) (defining the New York standard). Advice by counsel and financial experts would
not relieve trustees of responsibility for negligent investment decisions. See In re Clark's
Will, 242 N.Y.S. 210, 215 (Sur. Ct. 1930). But see In re Blafe's Will, 739, 274 N.Y.S. 284
(Sur. Ct. 1934); Hunter v. Payne, 184 N.Y.S. 433, 436-37 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (holding fiduciary
not under duty to perform illegal act on beneficiary's behalf).
14. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
15. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
16. See supra note 1.
17. This "race to the bottom" has been the subject of immense scholarly literature.
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
18. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 43-44
(1995).
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1934 of the two statutes which even today constitute the centerpiece of
corporate law, the Securities Act of 193319 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,20 both of which were designed to protect investors from
money managers who manipulated markets for their own profit at inves-
tors' expense.21 One need only remember the rhetoric of Franklin
Roosevelt, who in campaigning for the reform of Wall Street and in sign-
ing the 1933 act, condemned the "[p]ractices of the unscrupulous money
changers," who "had shown themselves either incompetent or dishonest
in their handling of the people's funds[,] . . . had used the money en-
trusted to them in speculations and unwise loans," and, as a result, stood
"indicted in the court of public opinion." 22 The new legislation, the Presi-
dent promised, would rectify the failings of existing state fiduciary law
and thereby "correct some of the evils which ha[d] been so glaringly re-
vealed in the private exploitation of the public's money. '23
Based on the principle of loyalty elaborated in Meinhard and in the
1933 and 1934 acts, courts during the 1920's and 1930's, as well as later
decades, routinely held numerous fiduciaries liable for breach of duty.
Among fiduciaries held liable for breach of duty were managers or direc-
tors who used their position to seize control of corporations or assist
others in doing so,24 to obtain unfair bargaining power over principals, 25
to engage in secret or excessively profitable purchase or sale transactions
with respect to those to whom they owed a duty,26 or to divert business
and profits away from individuals or corporations to which the business
or profits rightfully belonged.27 A court could validate an otherwise inva-
lid transaction, however, if upon full factual examination, it found it to be
fairly and openly made upon adequate consideration.28
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934).
21. See SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 6-100. Seligman's tome develops fully the history
of the statutes and of the case law elaborating them, which is beyond the scope of the
present article.
22. Id. at 29-30.
23. Id.
24. See Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 170 N.E. 917 (N.Y.1930); Hammer
v. Werner, 265 N.Y.S. 172 (App. Div. 1933). But cf. Hauben v. Morris, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721
(App. Div. 1938) (holding directors permitted to purchase debt obligations of corporation);
Frank Gilbert Paper Co. v. Prankard, 198 N.Y.S. 25 (App. Div. 1923) (holding directors
permitted to purchase stock in corporation).
25. See Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 179 N.E. 373 (N.Y. 1932); George Haiss Mfg.
Co. v. Becker, 189 N.Y.S. 791 (App. Div. 1921).
26. See Frank v. Carlisle, 27 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1940); New York Trust Co. v. American
Realty Co., 155 N.E. 102 (N.Y. 1926); Ludlam v. Riverhead Bond & Mortgage Corp., 278
N.Y.S. 487 (App. Div. 1935); Herring-Curtiss Co. v. Curtiss, 227 N.Y.S. 489 (App. Div.
1928); Hauben v. Morris, 291 N.Y.S. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Union Discount Co. v. MacRobert,
234 N.Y.S. 529, 531-33 (Sup. Ct. 1929); cf. DiTomasso v. Loverro, 293 N.Y.S. 912 (App.
Div. 1937) (holding contract made by directors for personal gain void).
27. See Harrison v. Egan, 1 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1936); Byrne v. Barrett, 197 N.E. 217
(N.Y. 1935); Quintal v. Kellner, 189 N.E. 770 (N.Y. 1934). But cf. Paul v. Walter, 8
N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (holding that an officer and director are not required to give a
covenant not to compete when the corporation is taken over by another in a merger).
28. See Gerdes v. Reynolds, 22 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (N.Y. 1939); Harr v. Wells-Newton
Nat'l Corp., 278 N.Y.S. 933 (App. Div. 1935); Laue v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 276 N.Y.S.
2000]
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In addition to liability for breach of the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries were
held liable for waste or other loss of trust or corporate assets resulting
from negligence.2 9 Numerous cases held that a trustee who placed trust
funds in an investment not on the list of statutorily approved investments
was liable for any losses30 unless the settlor had specifically authorized
the investment.31 However, failure to diversify investments, without
more, did not constitute waste.32
173 (App. Div. 1934); see also Mills v. Bluestein, 9 N.E.2d 944 (N.Y. 1937) (refusing to hold
trustee liable for loss of investment if all possible care had been used in connection there-
with); cf In re Ungrich, 190 N.Y.S. 187 (Sur. Ct. 1921) (permitting beneficiary to approve
and thereby validate unlawful investment of fiduciary).
29. See In re Smith, 18 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1939) (dictum); Potter v. Walker, 11
N.E.2d 335, 337 (N.Y. 1937) (dictum); Delafield v. Barret, 200 N.E. 67, 69 (N.Y. 1936);
Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Ott, 289 N.Y.S. 228 (App. Div. 1936).
30. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Lewis, 18 N.E.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. 1939);
Stark v. National City Bank of New York, 16 N.E.2d 376, 378 (N.Y. 1938); In re Carnell's
Will, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div. 1940).
31. See Feist v. Fifth Ave. Bank of New York, 20 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1939) (by implica-
tion); Gould v. Gould, 213 N.Y.S. 286, 295-96 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (dictum); In re Wilkes Estate,
15 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sur. Ct. 1939); In re Kramer's Estate, 15 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sur. Ct. 1939). A
trustee also could not borrow money to protect trust assets without court approval. See
Wolff v. Mortgage Comm'n, 1 N.E.2d 835 (N.Y. 1936).
32. See In re Young's Estate, 288 N.Y.S. 569 (Sur. Ct. 1936). There were some issues,
though, over which courts in the 1920's and 1930's were divided. One was whether an
inactive trustee or director who left management of trust or corporate affairs to fellow
trustees or directors was liable for their misfeasance. Compare Jersawit v. Kaltenbach, 1
N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1938) (treasurer and director not responsible for wrongful act of
corporation president); Hill v. International Prods. Co., 220 N.Y.S. 711, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1925)
(director not responsible for wrongful act for which he did not vote); In re Whitmore's
Estate, 15 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (sister trustee who allowed her two brother trustees
to administer trust not liable for their misfeasance); In re Dawes' Estate,12 N.Y.S.2d 6
(Sur. Ct. 1939) (trustee not active in administration of trust and who received no money or
property not liable for misfeasance of co-trustee), with Brown v. Phelan, 228 N.Y.S. 466
(App. Div. 1928) (co-trustees who signed inventory but left fellow trustee in total control
liable for misfeasance); In re Binder, 15 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (director has "'bur-
den of active, diligent, and single-eyed service"') (quoting People v. Marcus, 185 N.E. 97,
98 (N.Y. 1933); VanSchaick v. Aron, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550, 562 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (director liable
for misfeasance of co-director if director was negligent In respect thereto); Walker v. Man,
253 N.Y.S. 458, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ("director may not shut off liability by shutting off his
hearing and sight"). Another unsettled issue was the power of a settlor of a trust to au-
thorize a trustee to engage in otherwise prohibited acts. See In re Balfe's Will, 274 N.Y.S.
284 (Sur. Ct. 1934) (testator's approval of trustee's investments provides authorization
therefor), modified on other grounds, 280 N.Y.S. 128 (App. Div. 1935). Cf. In re Doelger's
Estate, 299 N.Y.S. 565 (Sur. Ct. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div.
1938) (testator may require trustees to organize corporation to continue his business). An-
other concerned the capacity of beneficiaries to ratify and thereby legitimate prohibited
acts of fiduciaries. Compare In re Schoenewerg's Estate, 14 N.Y.2d 777 (N.Y.1938) (writ-
ten release by remainderman bars claim against trustee); Holland v. Presley, 8 N.Y.S.2d
804 (App. Div. 1939) (upholding settlement by corporate directors of misfeasance of presi-
dent); Alexander v. Kotzen, 19 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (acquiescence in investment
bars subsequent objection by beneficiaries); In re Packard's Estate, 261 N.Y.S. 580 (Sur.
Ct. 1932) (acquiescence in investment bars subsequent objection by remainderman), with
Skinnell v. Mahoney, 189 N.Y.S. 845 (App. Div. 1921) (consent of contingent remainder-
men required to validate wrongful acts of trustee). Another was about the formalities and
procedures required for an act of fiduciaries to bind a corporation or trust. Compare
Knapp v. Rochester Dog Protective Ass'n, 257 N.Y.S. 356 (App. Div. 1932) (only formal
meeting with minutes can bind corporation); Allison & VerValen Co. v. McNee, 9 N.Y.S.2d
708, 713 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (unanimous consent of trustees required to bind trust), with Kahn
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An especially difficult issue confronting judges concerned how to bal-
ance the conflicting obligations of fiduciaries to use good faith, diligence,
and prudence in dealing with multiple beneficiaries. It was settled, for
example, that corporate officers and directors were responsible not only
to stockholders, but also to a corporation's creditors, and the interests of
these two groups sometimes were in conflict. 33 Similarly, most trustees
were responsible both to current beneficiaries of a trust and to holders of
future interests 34 as well as to the mission and memory of the settlor.35
This latter conflict led to the development of complex law on the issue,
for instance, of whether money paid to a trustee should be treated as
income payable to present beneficiaries or principal to be preserved for
future ones. 36 Similar complex doctrine developed on the question of
whether certain expenses should be charged to a trust's income or princi-
pal account.37
High-toned rhetoric of the sort used by Cardozo in Meinhard v.
Salmon38 was typically used by judges in their analysis of fiduciary duty,
especially during the 1920's and 1930's, and the cases create the impres-
sion that the rhetoric to some degree affected results.39 At the same time,
however, judges recognized that the status of fiduciary had business qual-
ities. Prior to 1940, the business aspects of fiduciary law were reflected
mainly in the rules allowing fiduciaries to receive financial compensation
for their services, although only in amounts regulated by statute.40 But
v. Colonial Fuel Corp., 198 N.Y.S. 596 (App. Div. 1923) (informal meeting sufficient to fire
employee); Bown v. Ramsdell, 249 N.Y.S. 387, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (informal assent of
majority of directors binds corporation). Confusion also arose from judicial statements,
on the one hand, that "the conduct of ... affairs pursuant to ... family arrangement"
would "negative" rules requiring the ordinary formalities, Birkmire v. Campus Realty
Corp., 227 N.Y.S. 653, 654 (App. Div. 1928); accord, In re Anyon's Estate, 244 N.Y.S. 244,
247 (Sur. Ct. 1930); cf. In re Hopson's Will, 211 N.Y.S. 128, 131 (App. Div. 1925) (finding
mother as trustee for children has wide discretion as to character of home to be main-
tained); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator & Warehouse Co., 200 N.Y.S. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
(recognizing that parents often hold property in their own names in trust for their chil-
dren); In re Stewart's Estate, 3 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sur. Ct. 1937) (holding that family member
upon accepting trusteeship need not surrender special privileges conferred by settlor), and,
on the other hand, that "the strictest scrutiny [should] be applied to transactions ... be-
tween a parent and child." In re Bihn's Estate, 11 N.Y.S.2d 824, 827 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
33. See Stratton v. Bertles, 263 N.Y.S. 466 (App. Div. 1933); John H. Giles Dyeing
Mach. Co. v. Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Mach. Co., 209 N.Y.S. 616 (App. Div. 1925);
Doehler v. Real Estate Board of New York Bldg. Co., 270 N.Y.S. 386, 401-02 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
34. See April v. April, 7 N.E.2d 711 (N.Y.1937); In re Osborn, 299 N.Y.S. 593 (App.
Div. 1937); In re Phelps's Estate, 295 N.Y.S. 840 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
35. See President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Prudence Co., 194 N.E. 408
(N.Y.1935) (trustee bound by provisions of trust agreement).
36. See In re McManus' Will, 26 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y.1940); City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. Wylie, 7 N.E.2d 241 (N.Y.1937); In re Martin's Will, 199 N.E. 491 (N.Y.1936).
37. See In re Rowland's Estate, 6 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 1937); In re Jackson's Will, 179
N.E. 496 (N.Y.1932); Furniss v. Cruikshank, 132 N.E. 884 (N.Y. 1921); In re Martin's Es-
tate, 1 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
38. 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
39. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
40. See In re Schinasi's Will, 14 N.E.2d 58 (N.Y. 1938); Corn Exch. Bank Trust Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 197 N.E. 259 (N.Y. 1935); In re Coutts' Will, 183 N.E. 200, 202 (N.Y.
20001
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after 1940, a business-centered approach to the law of fiduciary duty
gained increasing importance in other respects.
II. FIDUCIARIES AS UPWARDLY MOBILE ENTREPRENEURS,
1940-1980
In the 1940's and the decades that followed, subtle changes began to
occur in the application of the law of fiduciary duty. Although courts did
not alter the formal rules of black-letter doctrine in any drastic fashion,41
they did begin, during the course of the 1940's and thereafter, to apply
them in a more pragmatic fashion that was increasingly sensitive to the
entrepreneurial needs of both fiduciaries and beneficiaries. In particular,
the courts grew more tolerant of higher-risk investment practices of en-
trepreneurial fiduciaries who sought to increase income or grow principal
and less concerned with ensuring the security of investments.
Washer v. Seager, with its stated refusal to "exalt form over sub-
stance," 42 set the tone of pragmatism and preference for entrepreneur-
ship to which most judges adhered in subsequent years. For
approximately two years, Washer and Seager had been the two sole
shareholders and the officers and directors of a clothing manufacturing
1932); In re Schliemann's Will, 182 N.E. 153, 156 (N.Y. 1932). But see Fox v. Arctic Placer
Min. & Mill Co., 128 N.E. 154, 155 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that absent explicit provision to
the contrary, corporate officers and directors serve without compensation); Herman v.
Gutman, 280 N.Y.S. 410, 412 (App. Div. 1935) (holding that absent explicit provision to
the contrary, corporate officers and directors serve without compensation); James v. Alder-
ton Dock Yards, 231 N.Y.S. 215 (App. Div. 1928) (absent explicit provision to the contrary,
corporate officers and directors serve without compensation). But additional compensa-
tion was appropriate in cases where fiduciaries performed duties beyond the ordinary. See
Parsil v. "Onyx" Hosiery, Inc., 159 N.E. 651 (N.Y. 1927); Alexander v. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc., 135 N.E. 509, 511 (N.Y. 1922); Fox v. Arctic Placer Min. & Mill Co., 128 N.E.
154, 155 (N.Y. 1920); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 246 N.Y.S. 204, 207 (App. Div.
1930); cf. Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 109-12(Sup. Ct. 1934) (upholding payment to employees of a percentage of gross profit as a bo-
nus); Kleinbaum v. Miller, 195 N.Y.S. 821 (App. Div. 1922) (involving contract for percent-
age of profits); Wightman v. G.G. Hynson & Co., 189 N.Y.S. 446 (App. Div. 1921)(involving contract for percentage of profits). Under appropriate circumstances, legal fees
and other expenses incurred by a fiduciary also were reimbursed. See Corn Exch. Bank
Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 197 N.E. 259 (N.Y. 1935); In re DeBeixedon's Will, 186
N.E. 431, 434 (N.Y. 1933); In re Hidden, 154 N.E. 538, 542-43 (N.Y. 1926); Ellis v. Kelsey,
150 N.E. 148, 149 (N.Y. 1925); cf. Percy v. Huyck, 169 N.E. 127, 128-29 (N.Y. 1929) (hold-
ing that trustee may withhold conveyance to beneficiary until reimbursed for expenses).
But reimbursement was not permitted if expenditures had not been necessary. See In re
Eddy's Will, 201 N.Y.S. 760 (App. Div. 1923). These rights to compensation and reim-
bursement of expenses were forfeited, however, if a fiduciary was disloyal. See Lamdin v.
Broadway Surface Adver. Corp., 5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 1936); Sundland v. Korfund Co., 20
N.Y.S.2d 819 (App. Div. 1940); Lent-Agnew Realty Co. v. Trebert, 208 N.Y.S. 598 (App.
Div. 1925); cf. Cox v. Leahy, 204 N.Y.S. 741, 746 (App. Div. 1924) (holding salary waived if
not demanded promptly). Compensation or reimbursement also would be forfeited if they
had been unauthorized or were excessive. See Walsh v. Van Ameringen, 178 N.E. 764(N.Y. 1931); Coplay Cement Mfg. Co. v. Loeb, 207 N.Y.S. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Cf. Clifford
v. Firemen's Mut. Benev. Ass'n, 249 N.Y.S. 713 (App. Div. 1931) (holding suit for salary
not allowed when excessive).
41. See supra notes 2-29 and accompanying text.
42. 71 N.Y.S.2d 46, 54 (App. Div. 1947).
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company. "Seager had furnished the business skill and ability; Washer
was financier. ' 43 When Seager decided in 1943 to break with Washer and
enter the same business with another firm, Washer brought suit for
breach of the duty of loyalty. However, the court, reasoning that Washer
was "attempting to ... establish a right to share indefinitely, as an inac-
tive partner, in Seager's business ability, skill and enterprise," 44 ruled that
Seager was free to leave one firm and use his entrepreneurial skills to
enter into competition with it on behalf of a new firm. In so ruling, the
court expressed its emerging preference for encouraging entrepreneurs to
use their skills to promote their own upward mobility as well as the econ-
omy's growth, even at the expense of rentier capitalists seeking invest-
ment security.
Other cases agreed that an employee had "the right to leave" his em-
ployment, "establish his own business, solicit" his former employer's
"customers and compete.., in free enterprise, unless he were either con-
tractually restricted from doing so or some fraud or unfair competition
were involved. '45 A director or employee also was free, at least in the
absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, to work for another em-
ployer,46 even in dealing in competing products.47 As the court in Feiger
v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd.48 stated when an employer tried to interpose a de-
fense of breach of fiduciary duty against an employee who sued to re-
cover unpaid commissions earned before he deserted the employer in
order to open his own business:
plaintiff was simply pursuing the normal American dream of better-
ing himself by going out on his own, and he did it without harming
defendant in any way. To deprive him of his hard-earned commis-
sions-when preparing for his new enterprise involved neither taking
secrets or special knowledge away from defendant, nor lessening his
work for defendant while he remained there-would be to unjustly
enrich defendant. Much as I sympathize with defendant's unhappi-
ness over being deserted by his partner, together with his sole and
valued salesman, the Court cannot be a party to solacing that unhap-
piness with plaintiff's earnings.49
Another doctrine, which courts in the 1940's began to subtly transform,
dealt with the appropriation by majority directors of business opportuni-
ties belonging to their corporation. The turning point was Blaustein v.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Commonwealth Sanitation Co. of New York, Inc. v. Fox, 107 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938
(Sup. Ct. 1951); accord, Public Relations Aids, Inc. v. Wagner, 324 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div.
1971); Eastern Air Devices, Inc. v. Gaites, 118 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 1953).
46. See Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1967); Heyman v. Heyman, 33
N.Y.S.2d 235, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
47. See Raycarr Sales Corp. v. Herman Rynveld's Son Corp., 147 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Broderick v. Blanton, 59 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
48. 382 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 382 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App. Div. 1976), order
affd, 363 N.E.2d 350 (N.Y. 1977).
49. Id. at 220.
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Pan American Petroleum & Oil Transport Co.,50 where Supreme Court
Justice Samuel I. Rosenman5 l presided over a 70-day nonjury trial. At
issue was whether Standard Oil of Indiana, which owned nearly 80% of
Pan American's shares,52 aided and abetted by Standard Oil of New
Jersey, had deprived Pan American's wholly owned subsidiary, the Amer-
ican Oil Co., the creator of premium-grade gasoline under the brand
name Amoco, of profitable opportunities to drill and refine oil on the
Texas Gulf coast. Applying the traditional principles found in Meinhard
v. Salmon53 and the 1933 and 1934 securities acts that "equity ... de-
mands of a trustee undeviating loyalty to his beneficiary" 54 and that a
"fiduciary is forbidden to enter a situation where personal interest will
conflict with the interest of his principal," 55 Rosenman held that the di-
rectors of Pan American had diverted its business opportunities to Stan-
dard of Indiana, from which they, in turn, received benefit, and thereby
breached their fiduciary duty.
The Appellate Division reversed. It found that Pan American's direc-
tors had acted "in good faith and in the exercise of their honest judg-
ment, '56 on the advice of counsel and without profit to themselves, and
thus had not breached their duty as fiduciaries. The Court of Appeals
agreed. Although Judge Irving Lehman in dissent concluded that Pan
American's directors, all of whom were officers or directors of Standard
or its other subsidiaries, acted at the direction of and on behalf of Stan-
dard and therefore were in breach of their duty to Pan American when
they diverted its business opportunities to Standard, 57 the majority shared
the Appellate Division's view that "[q]uestions of policy of management,
expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful ap-
propriation of corporate funds to advance corporate interests, are left
solely to the... honest and unselfish decision" of directors who, provided
they act "in good faith and the exercise of an honest judgment" without
personal gain to themselves,5 8 fulfil their fiduciary duty.
Two months after the Court of Appeals decision in Blaustein, the Ap-
pellate Division decided Turner v. American Metal Co.59 Like Blaustein,
50. 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd in part, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (App. Div. 1941),
aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1944).
51. Rosenman, it should be noted, was one of the three people asked by President
Roosevelt to determine which of his presidential papers should not be made immediately
available to the public. See infra text and accompanying notes. Rosenman was also coun-
sel to Roosevelt when he was Governor of New York and the creator of Roosevelt's
"Brain Trust" in the 1932 campaign. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 32 (1963).
52. The Blaustein family owned 20%.
53. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
54. 21 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
55. Id. at 731.
56. Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Oil Transp. Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, 951 (App.
Div. 1941).
57. Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Oil Transp. Co., 56 N.E.2d 705, 714-17 (N.Y.
1944).
58. Id. at 715.
59. 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (App. Div. 1944), rev'g 36 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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Turner was a case in which several individuals held officerships or direc-
torships on both a parent and its subsidiary corporation and thus faced
conflicts of interest. The Appellate Division declared, however, that "the
mere existence of such a divided loyalty did not, of itself, warrant the
imposition of liability against directors. ' 60 In view of the parent's large
financial stake in the subsidiary, the Appellate Division stated that the
parent's officers and directors "not only had the right but were under a
duty to act as directors [of the subsidiary], rendering such services as were
necessary."'61 The Court continued that they "committed no wrong in en-
tering into reciprocal arrangements for the supplying of information and
technical data and for the exchange of routine services beneficial to both
companies. ' 62 It concluded that the "law [was] well settled that minority
stockholders may not interfere with the management of a corporation so
long as the trustees are acting honestly and within their discretionary
powers. " 63
It is noteworthy in the Blaustein case that two judges closely associated
with the New Deal-Samuel Rosenman, who had been counsel to Frank-
lin Roosevelt during his governorship, and Irving Lehman, the brother of
New Deal Governor Herbert Lehman-both stood by traditional notions
of fiduciary duty with their emphasis on high ethical standards, avoidance
of conflict of interest, and security of investments. In the final Blaustein
and Turner decisions, on the other hand, most of the New York judiciary
leaned in the direction of enhancing the entrepreneurial freedom of busi-
ness managers at the possible expense of fully equitable treatment of in-
vestors inactive in corporate governance. These decisions had a striking
parallelism to cases like Washer and Feiger.
Another doctrine that tended to enhance entrepreneurial freedom at
the expense of investor equity was the business judgment rule, which was
fully elaborated in the 1940's. The business judgment rule was not en-
tirely new in that decade, however. Courts had long announced that di-
rectors were "clothed with the power of controlling the property [of a
corporation] and with its management" and that "the soundness or wis-
dom of the directors' judgment [would] not be judicially reviewed, where
there is neither bad faith nor fraud."' 64 There were even old references to
the words "sound business judgment. '65 But key developments did begin
to occur in the early 1940's.
The first case of significance in that decade was Nilan v. Colleran,66 in
which the Court of Appeals held that an international union properly
60. Id. at 830.
61. Id. at 829.
62. Id.
63. Id.; accord, Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
64. Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 208 N.Y.S. 589,592-93 (App. Div. 1925); accord, Koral
v. Savory, Inc., 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (N.Y. 1937); Stoddard v. Schwab, 8 N.Y.S.2d 535 (App.
Div. 1938).
65. Nobis v. Nobis, 183 N.Y.S. 726, 727 (App. Div. 1920).
66. 27 N.E.2d 511 (1940).
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chartered a new local union in rivalry with an existing local on behalf of
which plaintiff brought suit. The Court reasoned unanimously that the
decision to grant a new charter "was within the discretion and business
judgment" of the international board, even though it "may have been
discriminatory" in regard to the existing local.67 Although Nilan was not
a corporate case, the Court in its decision deployed the language of busi-
ness judgment in a fashion precisely analogous to that in which future
corporate cases would use it.
Even more important was In re Miglietta,68 where a divided Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a board of directors of a mort-
gage salvage corporation could sell the corporation's only asset-realty
obtained pursuant to a foreclosure-without shareholder approval.
Three judges, including Chief Judge Irving Lehman, who, as mentioned
earlier, dissented in Blaustein v. Pan American69 out of concerns for eq-
uity to minority shareholders, voted in favor of requiring shareholder ap-
proval as the only means by which minority shareholders could protect
their interests. A four-judge majority, however, applied the business
judgment rule and held, on the ground that the corporation's divestiture
of the asset "manifestly was a sale in the regular course of its business," 70
that the sale required nothing other than the good faith approval of the
board. Again, the managerial freedom of entrepreneurs had triumphed
at the expense of protecting minority shareholders.
Meanwhile, lower courts were reifying doctrine. Thus, the First De-
partment wrote in 1941 that as long as "a director exercises his business
judgment in good faith on the information before him, he may not be
called to account through the judicial process" and that a minority share-
holder seeking to call directors to account had "to allege facts showing
more than error in business judgment."'71 Three years later, a trial judge
wrote that "there [could] be no quarrel" with "the business judgment
rule, so-called, and... [the] numerous authorities standing for the propo-
sition that a court [would] not substitute its judgment for that of duly
constituted officers and directors. ' 72 By the time a trial judge refused to
enjoin the departure of baseball's New York Giants to San Francisco on
the ground that no one could "question the efficacy of a business judg-
ment of the Board of Directors," 73 the business judgment rule had be-
come an accepted part of New York jurisprudence 74 and a Court of
67. Id. at 514-15.
68. 39 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 1942).
69. Blaustein v. Pan Am. Oil & Transp. Co., 56 N.E.2d 705, 716-17 (N.Y. 1944).
70. 39 N.E.2d at 228.
71. Rous v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (App. Div. 1941).
72. Dumont v. Raymond, 49 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
73. November v. National Exhibition Co., 173 N.Y.S.2d 490, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
74. See Cullen v. Governor Clinton Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (App. Div. 1952); Fer-
guson v. Fergus Enters., Inc., 175 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Diston v. Loucks, 62
N.Y.S.2d 138, 145 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Appeals case, Kalmanash v. Smith,75 had been identified as its source,76
even though that case referred only to the concept of the rule and not to
any specific language. Thereafter, the business judgment rule was cited
with frequency 77 and it even made appearances in trusts and estates, as
distinguished from corporations cases. 78
It is still difficult to be certain about the significance of this reification
of the business judgment rule. Judges were applying the substance of the
rule throughout the early decades of the century in cases involving breach
of the duty of due care, and the main change that occurred in the 1940's
was that they assigned a label to what they were doing. But labels can
matter. As Matter of Miglietta illustrates, the reification of the business
judgment rule probably gave judges a better basis than they previously
possessed for declining to enforce the duty of loyalty, with its focus ulti-
mately on issues of equity between shareholders, and instead, deciding
cases "on the practical basis" 79 that entrepreneurs should be left free to
manage corporations efficiently-an approach leading to enforcement
only of the duty of care.
Other cases likewise favored entrepreneurial efficiency and its attend-
ant upward mobility over investor protection. As Jack Weinstein, an emi-
nent federal judge, declared in the 1960's: "[m]any managers of large
enterprises ... [were] men of relatively limited financial resources who
[had] risen quickly and recently through the technical ranks because of
their skill and optimism."80 Weinstein added that "rule[s] of law too re-
strictive and inflexible may overinhibit and dampen their drive without
providing gain to the investor."'81 Other judges similarly fostered the up-
ward mobility of new, often Catholic and Jewish entrepreneurs when they
reached a variety of holdings-that a corporate officer or director, if act-
ing in good faith, may profit from dealings with the corporation if the
corporation also profits;82 that the directors of a corporation in the pro-
cess of acquiring another corporation need not disclose all their plans for
75. 51 N.E.2d 681, 687 (N.Y. 1943).
76. For cases citing Kalmanash, see Greenebaum v. Felix Lilienthal & Co., 111
N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (App. Div. 1952); Ferguson, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 977; Dumont, 49 N.Y.S.2d
at 868.
77. See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980); Galef v. Alexan-
der, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 390,
406 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Levenson v. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 354, 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Levin v.
Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353, 363-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Milstein v. Werner, 57
F.R.D. 515, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y.
1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1980); Heimann
v. American Express Co., 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Abramson v. Blakeley,
202 N.Y.S.2d 586, 591 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
78. See In re McCormack's Will, 147 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Rehill's
Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
79. Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 337 (N.Y. 1954).
80. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (Weinstein, J.).
81. Id.




using the acquired corporation to enhance the acquirer's profits;83 and
that an investment company need not account to a corporation for profits
made as a result of information acquired during its negotiations to buy
the corporation's debentures.84
In pursuit of analogous policies, still other judges held that honest reli-
ance on advice of counsel protected directors from personal liability;85
that "policies of expansion" justified nonpayment of dividends;86 that a
board of directors could remove a dissenting and uncooperative president
in the interest of corporate unity;87 and that, in the absence of loss of
corporate funds or of personal profit to itself, management could author-
ize a corporation to purchase its own stock in the open market in order to
perpetuate management's control.88 The courts also bent traditional
rules of fiduciary duty to facilitate the accumulation of start-up capital for
new enterprises 89 and to create new institutional arrangements, such as
agents for actors, 90 needed for particular industries to function.
The judiciary's concern for practicality, efficiency, and entrepreneur-
ship also manifested itself in the law of trusts. Therefore, when Congress,
in 1969, altered the terms on which trusts could accumulate and distribute
money to charities, the New York courts promptly amended the terms of
trusts created under the old Internal Revenue Code so they could con-
tinue to operate with all available federal tax benefits under the new
law.91 Similarly, when changes in conditions relating to real estate financ-
ing made it impossible to comply with a trust settlor's investment restric-
tions, the trustees were "freed from the obligation imposed by" the trust
and directed "to invest the funds of the trust estate in any of the invest-
ments authorized under ... existing law."' 92 Other cases held that trust-
ees could cooperate with family members to maintain family control of
close corporations93 and that fiduciaries could rely on electronic methods
83. See Box v. Northrop Corp., 459 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
84. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dymanics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
85. See Gilbert v. Burnside, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 216 N.Y.S.2d
430 (App. Div. 1961).
86. Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 701 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
87. See Republic Corp. v. Carter, 253 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1964).
88. See Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959). For an-
other case involving judicial acceptance of means used in a battle for corporate control, see
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
89. See Semensohn v. Weisblum, 118 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
90. See Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149 (N.Y. 1951).
91. See In re Danforth's Estate, 366 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sur. Ct. 1975); In re Estate of Pres-
ley, 351 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Roche's Will, 330 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sur. Ct. 1972);
In re Barkey's Estate, 318 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sur. Ct. 1971); In re Estate of Klosk, 319 N.Y.S.2d
685 (Sur. Ct. 1971). For another case legitimating fiduciary conduct designed to minimize
federal tax burdens, see Grace v. Grace Nat'l Bank of New York, 465 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir.
1972).
92. In re Simons's Estate, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
93. See In re Cowles' Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160, 171-72 (App. Div. 1965); In re Hirshon's
Will, 221 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sur. Ct. 1961). However, trustees who controlled a corporation
through means of their own stock combined with trust stock were required to disclose
details of the corporation's activities. See In re Voice's Will, 227 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994 (Sur. Ct.
1962). For other cases dealing with the relationship between trust and corporate fiduciary
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of verification of security ownership when they were "unable to verify the
securities because of the necessities of modern technology in the transfer
of such securities. ' 94 The courts also upheld investments in common
trust funds against objections in order "to provide small investors with
the safety of diversified investment through a single medium. '95 Finally,
judges in the 1970's, partly in response to legislation, modified ancient
strictures against invasion of principal in favor of income beneficiaries,96
and recognized that "public policy," on occasion, justified the transfer to
those beneficiaries of "the principal of spendthrift trusts."97
The rule changes and shifts in judicial emphasis that this Part has ex-
amined made sense in the socio-economic context of the 1940-1980
period.
The most significant element in the context was inflation. By 1980, the
dollar had declined to merely 16.98 percent of its 1940 value,98 with the
result that a fixed-value investment of $1000 in 1940, with interest paid
out annually, would return a principal in 1980 with a purchasing power of
only $170 in 1940 dollars. Inflation made real return of principal possible
only if a money manager took added risks in order to make a growth
investment, and thus inflation required courts to reconsider the tradi-
tional assumption that an investment should at some date in the future
return principal intact,99 with periodic interest payments during the in-
duty, see In re Hubbell's Will, 97 N.E.2d 888 (N.Y. 1951); In re Wacht's Estate, 32 N.Y.S.2d
871, 900-902 (Sur. Ct. 1942).
94. Will of Rockefeller, 427 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sur. Ct. 1980).
95. In re Dugmore's Will, 199 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sur. Ct. 1960); accord, In re Morgan
Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
96. For cases illustrative of old doctrine, see Kemp v. Paterson, 188 N.Y.S.2d 161
(App. Div. 1959); In re Butler's Trust, 213 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1961); In re Estate of
Lyons , 176 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
97. In re Chusid's Estate, 301 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770 (Sur. Ct. 1969); accord, Estate of Still-
man, 433 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sur. Ct. 1980); cf. Matter of Gutterman, 432 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App.
Div. 1980) (holding great grandchildren who were contingent remaindermen could be rep-
resented by parents in proceeding to invade principal). But see Estate of Escher, 407
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (holding invasion of principal not warranted when income
beneficiary will receive no benefit and funds will be used only to reimburse state for costs
of institutional care).
98. See U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1996, at 483 (Washington, D.C., 116th ed. 1996).
99. This traditional assumption grew out of economic realities, such as the fact that the
purchasing power of the dollar in 1930 was identical to what it had been in 1801. Indeed,
the long-term trend during the nineteenth century had been deflationary, with the result
that in 1914 only 60 cents was required to purchase what had cost $1.00 in 1801. Except for
a brief time during the Civil War, significant inflation did not occur until World War I cut
the value of the dollar in half, with the result that $1.20 was required in 1920 to buy what
had cost $1.00 in 1801. But with falling prices in 1921 and 1922, the dollar rose back to its
1801 level in the latter year, and its value remained essentially constant until 1930. Be-
tween 1930 and 1933, a further decline in prices meant that only 78 cents was required to
buy what had cost $1.00 in 1801; this figure rose to 80 cents in 1934 and to 84 cents in 1940.
See U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, at 210-211 (Washington, D.C., Bicentennial
ed. 1976). Based on these figures, a fixed-value investment of $1000 in 1914, with interest
paid out annually, would return a principal with a purchasing power of $717 in 1940; a
fixed-value investment of $1000 in 1920, with interest paid out annually, would return a
principal with a purchasing power of $1,429 in 1940; and a fixed-value investment of $1000
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terim. Once inflation began to take its toll, the legal system simply had to
authorize fiduciaries to engage in somewhat more entrepreneurial invest-
ment policies than had been customary during the 1920's and 1930's.
Beginning with World War II, federal tax policies also made it impossi-
ble for fiduciaries to follow the conservative, non-entrepreneurial invest-
ment practices that had earlier been customary. In 1942, the top income-
tax rate rose to 88 percent on incomes over $200,000100 and, in 1944, to 94
percent. 101 In 1963, after major tax reduction legislation, the top rate still
was 70 percent,10 2 where it remained until the 1980's. Of course, the In-
ternal Revenue Code was filled with countless loopholes designed to in-
duce investors to engage in the kinds of activities favored by the Code.
Taken together, inflation, high tax rates, and tax loopholes forced inves-
tors to allot their money as the loopholes directed or else watch their
wealth dwindle as the value of the dollar declined. Federal law and policy
thus overwhelmed traditional state rules requiring conservative invest-
ments by fiduciaries and forced money managers to become
entrepreneurs.
Nonetheless, entrepreneurial investment policies might not have been
adopted if they had not succeeded. But they did succeed, at least in part
because the American economy enjoyed unprecedented growth during
World War II and the postwar decades. Measured in constant dollars,
gross national product rose 186 percent between 1940 and 1950, another
77 percent between 1950 and 1960, and by 1980, was 930 percent greater
than in 1940.103 This growth meant that most entrepreneurial investors
achieved the results which they sought, and this success, in turn, reduced
the pressure for adherence to the traditional, conservative investment
rules that might have existed if the economy had been less prosperous
and many more fiduciaries had made investments resulting in a loss.
The judiciary's deemphasis of the old common-law rules protecting in-
vestors was further aided by federal legislation that superseded the com-
mon law. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as we have seen, reflected the era's concerns over investor protec-
in 1930, with interest paid out annually, would return a principal with a purchasing power
of $1,190 in 1940. It made sense in an economic climate such as this to require a fiduciary
to keep principal intact at face value, but such a rule made no sense in later years, when a
fixed-value investment of $1000 in 1940, with interest paid out annually, would return a
principal with a purchasing power of only $170 in 1980.
100. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 102-03, 56 Stat. 798, 802-03.
101. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, §§ 3-4, 58 Stat. 231, 231-32.
102. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 111, 78 Stat. 19, 19-23.
103. See Historical Statistics, supra note 99, at 224; Statistical Abstract, supra note 98, at
443. Due to changes in the Government's statistical categories, it was necessary to move
from GNP to GDP in making the calculation for 1980. Both GNP and GDP are readily
available for 1960, and thus the 930 percent figure in the text reflects percentage increase
in GNP to 1960 and percentage increase in GDP after that date. In comparison with these
post-1940 growth rates, the growth rate from 1920 to 1929 was a mere 12.7 percent, and
with the Great Depression, gross national product fell below its 1920 amount, which it did
not again attain until 1940. The 1929 GNP was not reached and surpassed until 1941, by
which time the phenomenal growth of the new era had begun. See Historical Statistics,
supra note 99, at 224.
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tion. The two statutes embraced disclosure mechanisms, administrative
regulations, and ultimately civil remedies designed to guard against in-
sider manipulation of capital markers, and thus created safeguards for
investors that were superior to those extant under the common law of
fiduciary duty.1' 4 By 1980, a massive body of investor-protective case law
had matured,10 5 and its existence left common-law adjudicators some-
what freer to pursue objectives other than the protection of investors.
The final element which in context may have contributed to the shift to
rules authorizing fiduciaries to make more entrepreneurial investments
was a conscious policy choice, made by both courts and legislatures, to
promote upward socio-economic mobility rather than preserve the ex-
isting class structure. The tax and monetary policies considered above
surely had such an effect, as did one of the most important pieces of Con-
gressional legislation emerging out of World War II-the GI Bill giving
veterans of the war generous educational opportunities and financial sup-
port for home purchases.' °6 The New York legislature, in turn, contrib-
uted to a program of encouraging the underprivileged to purchase homes
through a civil rights law outlawing discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or religion, 0 7 and the court of appeals added its imprimatur by
protecting Catholic churches and synagogues against discriminatory zon-
ing legislation. 0 8 The judiciary's rejection of a traditional policy of re-
quiring fiduciaries to protect established wealth and its substitution of a
new policy of encouraging men of relatively limited financial resources to
rise through the ranks on the basis of their skill and optimism was the
analog in investment management to the zoning, mortgage, and educa-
tional policies that brought the immigrant underclasses of the 1920's into
the mainstream of New York's economy, society, and culture by the
104. The best history of federal securities regulation is Joel Seligman, The Transforma-
tion of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Cor-
porate Finance (1995). This history is outside the scope of the present article.
105. The Southern District of New York and the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit was, not surprisingly, the center of this rigorous development of federal securities law
during the 1960's and 1970's. For some of the cases, see Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1970); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1965); B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Seymour v. Bache
& Co., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lewis v. Valley, 476 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stratton Group, Ltd. v.
Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards,
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Popkin v. Dingman, 366 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Wohl v. Blair &
Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Fuller v. Dilbert,
244 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Mar-
quette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
106. See William E. Nelson and Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market Fail-
ure: An Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimi-
lation, 27 FORDHAM U"n. L.J. 197 (1999).
107. See id.
108. See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century




III. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
1940-1980
The second change that occurred in New York's law of fiduciary duty in
the decades following 1940 was in the subjects to which the law was ap-
plied. Beginning in 1940, chaos in Europe generated cases in which tradi-
tional issues of fiduciary duty arose in international contexts rather than
in the familiar context of one New Yorker investing money on behalf of
another. As the years advanced, cases reflecting the changing posture of
the United States in the world order continued to arise. Cases involving
domestic public policy issues also began to appear after 1940. By 1980,
fiduciary law had become a tool with which courts routinely addressed
public policy matters as well as issues of private investment management.
The crises first of World War II and then of the Cold War produced
several novel cases involving application of the law of fiduciary duty in
international contexts. One case, for example, was brought by Maurice
Feuchtwanger, a citizen of France who appears to have fled to New York
in 1940.110 In May 1939, before fleeing, he had purchased $81,500 of
United States Federal Reserve Notes through an Amsterdam brokerage
house and the Bank of Montreal, which on his instructions held the notes
"'for account of Banque Jordaan, Paris, in favor of Maurice
Feuchtwanger."' ' 1  In January 1940, Banque Jordaan, without
Feuchtwanger's knowledge, transferred the notes to Central Hanover
Bank in New York, which refused Feuchtwanger's demand for the money
after he had learned in October 1940 of its location. But, in a cryptic
opinion without analysis, the Court of Appeals ruled that Central Hano-
ver held the money in trust for Feuchtwanger and directed its payment to
him."12
Feuchtwanger appears to have been a victim of Nazi persecution, and
the solicitude which the courts showed for his case raises the question
whether they aided such victims in general. In fact, they did not. If any-
thing, New York courts were somewhat hostile to the victims of Nazi per-
secution 1 3 and displayed favoritism toward, if anyone, German nationals
and business entities. For example, when a victim of persecution, whose
"plight of necessity stir[red] sympathy, 1" 4 brought suit against a New
York charity to which postwar West Germany had given money for the
rehabilitation of Jewish victims of Nazism, a Supreme Court Justice de-
nied relief on the ground that only the Attorney General could bring suit
109. See id. at 50-53, 66-68, 101.
110. Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1942).
111. Id. at 434.
112. Less $16,500 which Feuchtwanger admitted he owed to Banque Jordaan. See id.
113. See Nelson, supra note 108, at 36.
114. Revici v. Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, Inc., 174
N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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on behalf of beneficiaries of a charitable trust.115 Similarly, in a share-
holders' derivative suit against the management of F.W. Woolworth for
failure to collect profits from its German subsidiary, another justice up-
held the validity of a Nazi regulation prohibiting the transfer of those
profits out of Germany,116 while an upstate surrogate ruled that, after
October 1951, Germans were no longer enemy nationals and could there-
fore succeed to property of a New York decedent.1 7 On the other hand,
a complaint in a derivative suit alleging that the directors of Standard Oil
of New Jersey had improperly transferred profits into the hands of I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, pursuant to a worldwide conspiracy
to monopolize the oil and chemical industries, was upheld in part against
a motion to dismiss.1 18
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co.119 also arose out of condi-
tions related to the Second World War. It involved the Kingdom's efforts
in January 1942 to purchase nitrogen-grade toluene necessary for the
manufacture of explosives, for which New York Trust Co. had issued to
the seller a letter of credit in the amount of $176,000 debited to the King-
dom's account. However, before the toluene could be shipped, the
United States seized it by eminent domain and gave a compensation
award of less than $79,000. Thus, either the seller, the bank, or the Swed-
ish government was out $97,000.
Identifying the victim of the loss depended on which entity had title to
the toluene, which depended on whether New York Trust had properly
issued the letter of credit, which, in turn, depended on whether New York
Trust's relationship to Sweden was that of a fiduciary with duties of dis-
closure or merely that of an arms-length, independent contractor. The
court refused to hold New York Trust to be a fiduciary, since that "would
necessarily disturb a common commercial practice, and courts will not
lend their aid in achieving a result which would create turmoil in the busi-
ness and financial world.' 120 Since New York Trust was not a fiduciary, it
had no duty to warn Sweden of possible risks involved in purchasing tolu-
ene, its letter of credit constituted valid payment for the toluene, and
upon receipt of payment by the seller, title to the toluene passed to
Sweden.
Sabbagh Bros., Inc. v. Lufty121 grew out of the Pacific War. Sabbagh,
prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States
in December 1941, had furnished cash to Lufty, its agent in China for the
purchase and fabrication of materials. Lufty had failed to deposit the
money in a bank, and, as a result, it apparently was confiscated by Japan
when the war began. Did this failure to use a bank constitute a breach of
115. See id.
116. See Schwab v. Kirby, 21 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
117. See In re Von Rumohr's Will, 127 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
118. See Clayton v. Parish, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
119. 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
120. Id. at 791.
121. 112 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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the fiduciary duty owed by an agent to its principal? Under the circum-
stances, the court held that it did not and thus that Sabbagh rather than
Lufty should bear the loss unforeseeably arising out of the war.122
No clear doctrinal pattern emerges out of these cases involving Ger-
many, Japan, and World War II. Courts addressed each case indepen-
dently on its apparent facts. If anything, New York judges favored
German nationals and citizens, perhaps to ensure that no one could ques-
tion their fairness.
In contrast, New York courts ruled more consistently in favor of vic-
tims of Communist tyranny. In Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozpont Buda-
pest,123 the former president of Hungary's Central Corporation of
Banking Companies sued the Corporation for breach of his employment
contract, made in September 1945, and for pension rights allegedly due
from the defendant as plaintiff's fiduciary. He had worked in accordance
with the contract, until in June 1947 he made a speech in the Hungarian
Parliament attacking the incumbent regime, asserting that it had contrib-
uted to the oppressive conditions in Hungary generated by Soviet occu-
pation. Thereafter, on August 9, 1947, a decree was signed by the
President of Hungary discharging plaintiff from his office with defend-
ant.124 The President told the plaintiff that he would have to bear the
consequences of his conduct "because the Russians do not joke in such
matters." Three days later another decree was signed appointing some-
one else as president of the defendant corporation. After midnight of
August 15, 1947, plaintiff and his wife escaped across the border into the
American zone of Austria, disguised as peasants. In October, 1947, a de-
cree was issued depriving plaintiff of his Hungarian citizenship. 125 On
these facts, the court ruled that plaintiff had been fired in breach of his
contract and affirmed an award of damages in excess of $70,000, including
pension rights, to be collected out of funds of the defendant that had
been attached in New York City.
Nine years later, the New York judiciary remained equally suspicious
of Hungarian authorities, when the Manhattan Surrogate upheld the re-
fusal of the trustee of the proceeds of Bela Bartok's estate to remit those
proceeds to Bartok's widow residing in Hungary, since there was no "as-
surance that the beneficiary would have the benefit, use and control of
the property sent to her."'1 26 Four years earlier a court had also upheld a
complaint by the President of the National Hungarian Government in
exile against Credit Suisse, for wrongfully delivering to authorities of the
Hungarian People's Republic a fund deposited by the National Govern-
ment.127 The complaint was ultimately dismissed, however, on grounds
122. See id. at 211.
123. 111 N.Y.S.2d 75 (App. Div. 1952).
124. See id. at 77.
125. See id.
126. In re Bartok's Estate, 215 N.Y.S.2d 818, 824 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
127. See Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 162 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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of the statute of limitations. 128
In re Estate of Sage,129 decided in January, 1979, reflected the changing
place of the United States and its citizens in the world some two decades
later. Cornelia Sage, upon her death in 1972, had established a spend-
thrift trust, with limited power to invade principle, in favor of her
grandchildren. Then, in 1976, one of the grandchildren, "Henry Sage, Jr.,
also known as Ricky, and his wife, Karen were taken into custody by
officials of the Brazilian Government and charged with the illegal posses-
sion of drugs.' 130 The parties stipulated that Brazilian jails contained
"primitive and brutal conditions including murders, sexual assaults, tor-
ture and abuse,"'131 which resulted in Ricky's father spending $15,000 in
medical and psychiatric expenses, $10,000 in fees to lawyers who negoti-
ated with Brazilian officials, and $75,000 in bribes to obtain Ricky's and
Karen's freedom. The father, in turn, sought reimbursement from the
trust.
The Court [did] not for a moment doubt the very real fear for the
safety and well-being of these children. The papers paint a picture of
prison life which humane individuals can barely comprehend. The
Court is presented with a most brutal depiction of prison conditions.
And these two Americans, beneficiaries of a substantial trust, found
themselves thrown into such a foreign and inhuman environment. It
is not necessary for this Court to delve into the cause or merits of the
imprisonment itself; nor can it question the motives of a father's de-
cision to employ this means to free his children from such intolerable
and life threatening prison conditions. No father could do less.132
Nonetheless, the Surrogate's humanitarianism, like that of his fellow citi-
zens, came into conflict with his and their adherence to the rule of law.
Thus, he could
not sanction conduct which would be at wors[t] punishable as a crim-
inal offense if committed within this State, and at best, contrary to
our public policy. Even if the Court were to accept the premise that
the children were improperly jailed and that the only way to save
their lives was to make illegal payments to obtain their release, such
an expenditure of trust funds could not be authorized by a court of
law in this State .... [I]f the trust provision itself explicitly author-
ized the use of trust funds for illegal purposes, or more specifically,
to pay bribes, a court could not permit such use of trust funds.133
Accordingly, reimbursement was allowed only for hospital expenses, but
not for either the legal fees or the bribes.
The Court of Appeals reached seemingly inconsistent results six
128. See Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 171 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 1958) (holding that the
applicable statute was the one for breach of contract, which had run, rather than for breach
of fiduciary duty, which had not run).
129. 412 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
130. Id. at 766.
131. Id.




months later in Auerbach v. Bennett, 34 which involved $11 million in
bribes and kickbacks made by General Telephone & Electronics Corpo-
ration and its subsidiaries in the United States and abroad between 1971
and 1975. The case was distinguishable from Sage in two respects: first, it
involved a corporation rather than a trust; and second, a special litigation
committee, consisting of directors who had not been members of the
board at the time of the questionable payments, had decided not to pur-
sue any claims for breach of fiduciary duty. In light, perhaps, of these
distinctions, the Court held that the committee's decision fell "squarely
within the embrace of the business judgment doctrine" and that to "per-
mit judicial probing.., would be to emasculate the business judgment
doctrine as applied to the actions and determinations of the special litiga-
tion committee. ' 135 Whatever the reasons for this holding, it must be
noted that the language of the Court of Appeals differed markedly in
tone from that of the trial judge in Sage. According to the Auerbach
court, the decision of GTE to bribe mainly foreign officials involved
the weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promo-
tional, public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolu-
tion of many if not most corporate problems .... [T]he courts cannot
inquire as to which factors were considered... or the relative weight
accorded them ... the reasons for the payments, the advantages or
disadvantages accruing to the corporation by reason of the transac-
tions, the extent of the participation or profit by the respondent di-
rectors and the loss if any, of public confidence in the corporation
which might be incurred. 136
The Court of Appeals expressed no concern whatever about sanctioning
conduct that might be criminal if committed in New York.
Sage, Auerbach and the other cases we have been analyzing were of
little or no doctrinal significance. To the extent they addressed issues of
doctrine, they resolved those issues in a straightforward fashion consis-
tent with precedent. They are important for two other reasons. First,
they reflect the changing position of the United States and its citizens in
the World-War II and postwar world. Second, the cases show how signifi-
cant issues of foreign relations were decided by state judges-mainly by
trial judges sitting at the county level.
One final case similarly involved deciding a question of national policy
by a local judge, in this case the Surrogate of Dutchess County. In re
Roosevelt's Will137 raised the issue whether Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1938
announcement of his plans for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde
Park and for the preservation of his presidential and other papers was
sufficient to transfer to the Library and its ultimate head, the Archivist of
the United States, not only the papers he already had delivered but also
the "White House Central Files" and his "papers relating to the prosecu-
134. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
135. Id. at 1002.
136. Id.
137. 73 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sur. Ct. 1947).
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tion of the War, commonly known as the 'Map Room Papers."'1 38 As of
1947, the White House Central Files had been transferred to Hyde Park,
but the Map Room Papers remained "in Washington, D.C., under the
custody of the President of the United States.
139
On these facts, the local Surrogate held that the late President had
"made a valid and effective gift of all his papers and files, including those
in his possession at the time of death[,] to the United States Government,
to be placed, maintained and preserved in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Li-
brary at Hyde Park, New York.' 40 The court also addressed a June 1943
memorandum, in which Roosevelt "expressed a wish that a committee of
three persons (Samuel I. Rosenman, Harry L. Hopkins, and Grace G.
Tully or the survivors thereof) examine his personal papers, and select
those which, in their opinion, should never be made public and those
which should remain sealed for a prescribed period of time.' 41 The
Dutchess Surrogate concluded that this memorandum was "not testamen-
tary in character," but was "merely a request to the Director of the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library... as to the handling of the papers and
files," thereby raising "an administrative question for the Government of
the United States and its Archivist, and not a judicial question for this
Court."'1 42 Thus, these important questions of national policy were trans-
ferred from Poughkeepsie back to Washington, D.C., where they
belonged.
Nonetheless, the law of fiduciary duty arose increasingly in the decades
after World War II to resolve larger issues of public policy rather than
merely the duty of one individual to hold and invest wealth for the bene-
fit of another. The law of trusts was addressed, for example, in litigation
over music performance rights between Broadcast Music, Inc. and the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 43 and over the
use by live performers in New York and Los Angeles of moneys contrib-
uted to a trust fund for the performers by the recording, motion picture,
and broadcasting industries. 144 Another fiduciary duty case prohibited
the sale of public school property to a church, on the ground that school
trustees had a fiduciary duty to sell the land to the highest bidder even
though voters who attended a public meeting preferred to sell to the
church. 145 Several cases dealt with job security and retirement rights of
public employees, 46 and a line of cases addressed litigation by real estate
138. Id. at 825.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 826.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 826-27.
143. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Taylor, 55 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
144. See Rosenbaum v. Melnikoft, 179 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
145. See Ross v. Wilson, 127 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1955); see also In re Dodge's Estate, 39
N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sur. Ct. 1943) (involving a trustee's investment in a mortgage over a syna-
gogue subsequently sold to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York and reinvest-
ment in a new synagogue).
146. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); City
of New York v. Schoeck, 63 N.E.2d 104 (N.Y. 1945); Weiss v. Opportunities for Cortland
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cooperatives and civic associations. 147 Other cases involved a factional
fight within the Democratic Party of the Sixteenth Assembly District of
Brooklyn, 148 a libel committed by a director of Aware, Inc., a member-
ship corporation, 49 and a claim by the National Committee on the Ob-
servance of Mother's Day for breaches of fiduciary duty by its advertising
agency.' 50 These cases, again, involved no significant doctrinal develop-
ment, but they are important because they show how old law developed
for adjudicating private disputes was put to broader and more public uses
in the half century following World War II.
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital'5' is an excellent illustration
of the new uses to which old doctrine was being put in the second half of
the century. The old doctrine had affirmed the unqualified right of cur-
rent directors of both business and not-for-profit corporations to examine
corporate books and records to enable them to perform their duties.152
Relying on this established doctrine, Hyman as a director sought access
to hospital records involving cancer experiments on patients. Under a
program financed by the U.S. Public Health Service and the American
Cancer Society, two doctors had injected foreign cancer cells into twenty-
two hospital patients in an effort to determine whether their immune sys-
tems would reject the cancer. The patients had consented to the injec-
tions, but they had not been "told that the injection was of cancer cells
because the doctors did not wish to stir up any unnecessary anxieties in
the patients."'1 53 On these facts, the trial court held the director entitled
County, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. 1972); Hamilton v. Patrolmen's Benevolent
Ass'n of New York, 88 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1949); see also Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F.
Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concerning pre-ERISA administration of retirement trust).
147. See Northridge Coop. Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 141 N.E.2d
802 (N.Y. 1957); Fillman v. Axel, 405 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 1978); Russo v. Zaharko,
385 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 1976); Vernon Manor Coop. Apartments, Section I v. Sala-
tino, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Westchester County Ct. 1958).
148. See Pino v. United Democratic Regular Org. of the Sixteenth Assembly Dist., Inc.,
195 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
149. See Faulk v. Milton, 268 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 1966).
150. See National Comm. on the Observance of Mother's Day, Inc. v. Kirby, Block &
Co., 229 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
151. 206 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1965).
152. See Cohen v. Cocoline Prods., Inc., 127 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1955); Davids v. Sillcox,
79 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1948); Dusel v. Castellani, 350 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 1973); Ex-Lax,
Inc. v. Goodman, 250 N.Y.S.2d 572 (App. Div. 1964); Davis v. Keilsohn Offset Co., 79
N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1948); People ex rel. Bellman Standard Match Co., 202 N.Y.S. 840
(App. Div. 1925); Wilkins v. M. Ascher Silk Corp., 201 N.Y.S. 739 (Ajpp. Div. 1923); Mar-
tin v. Martin Foundation, Inc., 224 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Melup v. Rubber Corp. of
America, 43 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But cf. Schichowski v. Hoffmann, 185 N.E. 676
(N.Y. 1933) (failing to deliver book does not give rise to cause of action for damages).
Former directors were entitled to examine books and records unless they were shown to be
acting in bad faith, see Hausner v. Hopewell Prod., Inc., 201 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div.
1960); Guadagno v. American Revolving Door Co., 224 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Shareholders had only a qualified right to examine books and records, see Sucher v. Radi-
ant Briar Pipe Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1960), and members of the general public
had no right at all, even in regard to the records of public corporations, see Getman v.
Mohawk Valley Nursing Home, Inc., 355 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1974).
153. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (App. Div. 1964).
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to the records,154 the Appellate Division reversed, 155 and then the Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial
court's ruling citing precedent as the sole basis. 156
Each extension of the law of fiduciary duty into areas involving issues
of public policy encouraged lawyers, of course, to seek further extensions.
It is unclear how far fiduciary law would have extended if judges had
been more supportive of its extension. But, as the divergent results in the
cases we have been examining suggest, judges were largely indifferent.
Indeed, in one key line of cases, the courts opposed using concepts of
fiduciary duty to attain desired public policies, even when the policies had
been enacted legislatively.
The first case in the line was Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,157
in which shareholders brought a derivative suit against Paramount's di-
rectors to compel them to restore to the corporation a $100,000 payment
out of corporate funds made to two labor union officials in order to in-
duce them not to call a strike. Plaintiffs claimed that the payment vio-
lated section 380 of the Penal Law, which provided that anyone "who
gives ... any money.., to any duly appointed representative of a labor
organization ... to induce him to prevent or cause a strike... is guilty of
a misdemeanor,"'158 and the court agreed that, if the $100,000 had been
given freely as a bribe, it would have been an unlawful expenditure of
corporate funds, and the directors would be required to restore it to the
corporation.159
The court, however, had "no difficulty or hesitancy" in finding that the
board "was not the giver of a bribe but a submitter to extortion.' 160 In
particular, it made the following specific finding about the defendant
Keough, the vice president and general counsel of Paramount who
orchestrated the board's decision to pay the $100,000, and William Bioff,
the union official who received it:
Keough had been an employee of Paramount since about 1919, and
an officer and director and counsel since 1932. He was regarded by
his associates, the other officers and directors, as honest and trust-
worthy and loyal and capable. In yielding to Bioff's demands and
making the payments he act[ed] upon the belief, honestly and in
good faith entertained by him, that in so doing he was promoting the
interest of the corporation he was serving by saving it from.., actual
bankruptcy, and the facts and circumstances existing at the time and
known to him afforded a reasonable basis for that belief. It was a
belief which under the circumstances an honest and diligent officer
and director of that corporation reasonably could entertain, and
154. See Application of Hyman, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
155. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (App. Div. 1964).
156. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 206 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y.1965).
157. 37 N.Y.S.2d 404,407 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affid, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1943), affid,






even upon this trial there [was] not a scintilla of evidence, or even an
attempt to prove, that that belief was wrong. Furthermore, there is
not the slightest suggestion that Keough or any other officer or direc-
tor in any way personally benefited by the payments or derived any
personal advantage therefrom.' 61
Read broadly, Hornstein, the result and reasoning of which were affirmed
both by the Appellate Division 162 and the Court of Appeals, 163 held that
fiduciaries who acted in good faith and received no personal benefit from
their actions did not breach a fiduciary duty, even if they had breached a
regulatory statute.
Five months later, Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.164 addressed the
issue of directors' liability for an adjudicated violation of the federal anti-
trust laws for which they had voted. Again, a court held that they were
not liable, since the directors "acted honestly and reasonably and for
what they believed to be the best interests of the company," and not
"fraudulently, negligently, corruptly or in bad faith."'1 65 The evidence
also failed to show that the directors "knew, or had reason to believe,"
that their activities "violated the Sherman Act" or "that they made any
personal profit or gained any personal advantage at the expense of the
corporation or otherwise."'1 66 Thus, Simon reaffirmed the broad reading
of Hornstein that fiduciaries who acted in good faith and received no per-
sonal benefit from their actions were not guilty of a breach of duty, even
if they had breached a regulatory statute.
At the beginning of the next year, the Court of Appeals in Kalmanash
v. Smith167 removed all remaining doubts when it again addressed the
issue of directors' liability for an adjudicated violation of the federal anti-
trust laws-in this instance, the Clayton Act, and declared succinctly that
it has "been held consistently that a stockholder's derivative action does
not lie for violation of the Clayton Act."'1 68 Subsequent cases adhered to
the rule that fiduciaries who violated a regulatory statute but otherwise
acted in good faith on behalf of their beneficiary and received no per-
sonal benefit from their actions were not guilty of a breach of duty.169
161. See id.
162. 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1943).
163. 55 N.E.2d 740 (N.Y. 1944).
164. 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
165. Id. at 273.
166. Id.
167. 51 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1943).
168. Id. at 688.
169. See Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Abrams v. Allen, 113
N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Hoffman v. Abbott, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1943). Cf.
Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 408 F. Supp.
1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding directors not liable for criminal conduct of others in which
they did not knowingly engage). But cf Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 113
N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1953) (holding corporation under no duty to reimburse director for costs
of his successful defense against criminal charges of antitrust violation); Abrams v. Allen,
74 N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y.1947) (holding directors liable for "the doing of an unlawful or
immoral act") (dictum).
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This refusal to extend doctrine so as to make fiduciaries liable for regu-
latory breaches committed in a good faith belief that they were furthering
the interests of their beneficiaries was not preordained. Indeed, one early
case, decided by a trial court in upstate Erie County, had reached the
opposite result when it required a man who was the manager of a busi-
ness, as well as a member of its board of directors, to reimburse the busi-
ness for $800 in bribes paid to local officials to overlook violations of the
Sunday closing laws.' 70 More recently, another trial judge had declared
that bank directors were duty-bound to abide by state banking regula-
tions, although he had declined to allow a shareholder to maintain a suit
for damages in a context in which the corporation had suffered no dam-
ages and had come into compliance with the law.17' On the other hand,
the refusal to hold fiduciaries liable for regulatory breaches was consis-
tent with the cases discussed in Part II above, which strove to enhance
entrepreneurial freedom. The refusal also reflected a general tendency
on the part of common-law judges in the decades after 1940 to recede
from regulatory activities when legislatures entered a field and estab-
lished complex regulatory structures. Whether they were acting out of a
growing distrust of the emerging regulatory state 172 or out of an anti-
progressive desire to limit the impact of the New Deal's often redistribu-
tive legislation, the refusal of New York's judges to bring the weight of
fiduciary duty to bear in support of regulatory enforcement weakened
that enforcement significantly.
To appreciate the weakness, one need only focus on the weighing of
risks in which a corporate officer or director had to engage in evaluating
corporate behavior which might later be found to violate a regulatory
statute. Typical regulatory sanctions consist of orders granting prospec-
tive relief, fines imposed on the corporate business entity, and occasion-
ally fines or minor criminal penalties imposed on corporate fiduciaries.
Often, the heaviest burden on a business subject to possible regulation
will be the legal expenses and similar costs incurred in fending it off. In
the world created by the Hornstein, Simon, and Kalmanash cases, fiducia-
ries could decide how to respond to prospective regulation without fear
of suffering serious personal liability. They were freed thereby to make
an entrepreneurial judgment, weighing possible corporate profits against
possible corporate regulatory losses, with knowledge that both profits
and losses would be spread among all shareholders. Thus, fiduciaries
could opt against regulatory compliance if prospective profits seemed suf-
ficiently high. Making them personally liable as fiduciaries for all corpo-
rate costs incurred at the hands of regulators, as the plaintiffs in
Hornstein, Simon, and Kalmanash proposed, would have altered this de-
cisional balance. By imposing costs on directors and officers, while leav-
170. See Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
171. See Runcie v. Corn Exch. Bank Trust Co., 6 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
172. See William E. Nelson, The Growth of Distrust: The Emergence of Hostility Toward
Government Regulation of the Economy, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1996).
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ing profits spread among all shareholdeis, the proposed rule would have
made fiduciaries much more concerned with avoiding costs than with
earning profits, would have forced them more frequently to obey regula-
tory legislation, and thereby would have increased regulatory compliance
at the cost of entrepreneurial activity. The Court of Appeals, however,
refused to sanction such a balance by allowing an expansion of fiduciary
law into a device for enforcing regulatory, often redistributive legislation.
Instead, it continued to assign fiduciary law a more limited role.
As a result of the Court's refusal to place the law of fiduciary duty in
service of the regulatory state or otherwise to change the black-letter
standard of fiduciary responsibility to any significant extent, the law, at
bottom, remained committed to insuring that private managers of private
investments acted honestly and with due diligence. As a result, the law of
fiduciary duty in 1980 did not differ greatly from what it had been in 1920.
Courts had applied it to occasional cases involving international and
other public policy issues and thereby somewhat expanded its scope.
They also had subtly changed the law's application so as to make it more
pragmatic and sensitive to the business and financial needs of both fiduci-
aries and beneficiaries and more tolerant of entrepreneurial activities
designed to increase income or grow principal. Most important, however,
were changes that the New York courts had refused to put into place.
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